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IN A FACT-SPECIFIC OPINION, THE COURT OF APPEALS, REVERSING THE APPELLATE DIVISION, DETERMINED THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE UNIVERSITY’S RULING THAT PETITIONER-STUDENT VIOLATED THE CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT BY ENGAGING IN UNWANTED SEXUAL ACTIVITY (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannatara, in a fact-specific analysis, determined the university’s ruling that petitioner, P.C., a university student, violated the Code of Student Responsibility by engaging in unwelcome sexual activity with another student, S.G., was supported by the evidence:

… [S]ubstantial evidence supports the determination that P.C. violated the Code of Student Responsibility by engaging in unwanted sexual activity with S.G. despite her physical resistance and loss of consciousness during separate encounters. Although some aspects of the sexual encounters may have been consensual, there is ample evidence that other aspects were not. S.G.’s unrebutted testimony was deemed credible and she provided consistent evidence, both in her written statement for the investigator and in her hearing testimony, that she tried unsuccessfully to physically remove P.C.’s hands from her neck during an encounter in the woods. Under the Code of Student Responsibility, her physical resistance is inconsistent with affirmative consent.

Similarly, with respect to the allegation that P.C. had sex with S.G. in the car without her affirmative consent, S.G. consistently maintained that she lost consciousness, woke up while P.C. was still having sex with her, and that P.C. then told her she had only been “out” for a moment. Under the Code, sexual activity must stop when a person is incapacitated by lack of consciousness or being asleep. Moreover, P.C.’s own text messages acknowledge the sexual contact and, to some degree, evince a consciousness of guilt.

The evidence adduced depicting unwelcome sexual conduct by P.C. constitutes substantial evidence supporting all three charges. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Appellate Division majority improperly reweighed the evidence by relying on S.G.’s statements concerning consensual conduct that transpired earlier in the evening, to the exclusion of her testimony regarding the contact to which she did not consent, and disregarded the conclusion that P.C.’s text messages reflected a consciousness of guilt. Matter of P.C. v Stony Brook Univ., 2025 NY Slip Op 01566, CtApp 3-18-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for some insight into the evidence which is sufficient to support a university’s ruling that a student should be suspended for violating the Code of Student Responsibility by engaging in unwanted sexual activity.

 

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