You are here: / / PLAINTIFF WAS REPAIRING THE FLASHING ON THE ROOF, NOT DOING ROUTINE MAINTENANCE,...
,

PLAINTIFF WAS REPAIRING THE FLASHING ON THE ROOF, NOT DOING ROUTINE MAINTENANCE, AT THE TIME HE WAS INJURED ENTITLING HIM TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was performing repairs, not routine maintenance, when he was injured, entitling him to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action:

“Delineating between routine maintenance and repairs is frequently a close, fact-driven issue . . . , and that distinction depends upon whether the item being worked on was inoperable or malfunctioning prior to the commencement of the work . . . , and whether the work involved the replacement of components damaged by normal wear and tear” … . Here, the testimony submitted by plaintiffs established, and the court found, that the rubber flashing was malfunctioning and inoperable prior to replacement and that the work being performed by plaintiff at the time of the accident was necessary to restore the proper functioning of the roof. To the extent that defendant asserts that the flashing plaintiff was repairing at the time of his fall was not actively leaking, such a contention is immaterial to whether plaintiff was performing a protected activity, inasmuch as it would be “[in]consistent with the spirit of the [Labor Law] to isolate the moment of injury and ignore the general context of the work” … .

Further, contrary to the court’s determination, we agree with plaintiffs that the rubber flashing was not merely a “component” of a ventilation system and instead was an integral part of a proper functioning roof. Here, plaintiff was performing roofing repair to ensure that the roof of the concession stand was no longer leaking—precisely the type of work that we have long held to be protected by Labor Law § 240 (1) … . Verhoef v Dean, 2024 NY Slip Op 06465, Fourth Dept 12-20-24

Practice Point: Here plaintiff was repairing the roof when he was injured. He was not performing routine maintenance. He was therefore entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action.

 

You might also like
The Absence of Plaintiff’s (Buyer’s) Attorney’s Explicit Unconditional Approval of the Purchase Contract Invalidated the Contract, Despite Plaintiff’s Desire to Go Through with the Purchase
SENTENCE DEEMED UNDULY HARSH (FOURTH DEPT).
Court Should Not Have Imposed a Greater Sentence Based Solely on Bare Fact Defendant Had Been Arrested Since His Guilty Plea
THE OBVIOUS BIAS OF THE JUDGE IN THIS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDING DEPRIVED MOTHER OF HER RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT). ​
19-Year Preindictment Delay Okay; Prior Incidents of Domestic Violence Probative of Motive, Intent and Identity; Admissions Are Direct, Not Circumstantial, Evidence
THE REMARKS MADE BY THE POLICE DURING THE INTERROGATION OF DEFENDANT SERVED TO NEGATE THE MIRANDA WARNINGS; INTERROGATION CONTINUED AFTER DEFENDANT ASSERTED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL; THE ERRORS WERE DEEMED HARMLESS BECAUSE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE BEEN CONVICTED EVEN IF THE STATEMENTS HAD BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).
STORM IN PROGRESS RULE REQUIRED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, FAILURE TO REMOVE ALL SNOW FROM A PARKING LOT DOES NOT CREATE A HAZARD.
Police Officer Struck by Plaintiffs’ Decedents When the Officer Was Making a U-Turn to Follow a Car Was Entitled to Summary Judgment Under the Statutory “Reckless Disregard” Standard

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTORNEYS STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR “DECEIT AND... THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION PURSUANT TO 18 USC 1983 AGAINST INDIVIDUAL...