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ALTHOUGH THE PARTIES WERE DIVORCED IN COLORADO, THEY AND THEIR CHILDREN RESIDE IN NEW YORK; THE SUPPORT MAGISTRATE SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED COLORADO LAW IN DETERMINING FATHER’S SUPPORT OBLIGATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the support magistrate should not have applied Colorado law. Although the parties were divorced in Colorado, the parties and the children all reside in New York:

“The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act . . . , ‘adopted in New York as article 5-B of the Family Court Act, grants continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order to the state that issued the order'” … . “As relevant herein, the issuing state loses such jurisdiction where none of the parties or children continue to reside in that state” … . Here, it is undisputed that the parties and their children reside in New York and that the mother registered the Colorado support order in this state. Thus, the Family Court, Westchester County, had jurisdiction to adjudicate the proceeding … .

Further, Family Court Act § 580-613(b) provides that, in a modification proceeding brought pursuant to section 580-613(a), the court “shall apply . . . the procedural and substantive law of this state” … . Here, the Support Magistrate improperly applied Colorado law in calculating the father’s modified support obligation … . Accordingly, the Family Court should have granted the mother’s objections. Matter of O’Connor v Shaw, 2024 NY Slip Op 06046, Second Dept 12-4-24

Practice Point: Here the parties were divorced in Colorado but they and their children reside in New York. New York has jurisdiction over the support proceedings. The Support Magistrate should not have applied Colorado law to the support calculation.

 

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