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DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE DEMONSTRATING IT LACKED CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE TEACHER’S ALLEGED PROPENSITY TO SEXUALLY ABUSE CHILDREN; THEREFORE ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant school district was not entitled to summary judgment in this case alleging sexual abuse by a teacher in 2013 – 2014. A question of fact had been raised about whether the school district knew or should have known of the teacher’s alleged propensity to abuse children:

“Although an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee who is acting solely for personal motives unrelated to the furtherance of the employer’s business, the employer may still be held liable under theories of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of the employee” … . “‘[A] necessary element of such causes of action is that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for the conduct which caused the injury'” … .

“A school ‘has a duty to exercise the same degree of care toward its students as would a reasonably prudent parent, and will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision'” … . “‘The standard for determining whether the school has breached its duty is to compare the school’s supervision and protection to that of a parent of ordinary prudence placed in the same situation and armed with the same information'” … . “‘The adequacy of a school’s supervision of its students is generally a question left to the trier of fact to resolve, as is the question of whether inadequate supervision was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury'” … . “Where the complaint alleges negligent supervision due to injuries related to an individual’s intentional acts, the plaintiff generally must demonstrate that the school knew or should have known of the individual’s propensity to engage in such conduct, such that the individual’s acts could be anticipated or were foreseeable” … . “‘Actual or constructive notice to the school of prior similar conduct generally is required'” … .

Here, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they lacked constructive notice of the teacher’s alleged abusive propensities and conduct … . In particular, the defendants submitted a transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, in which the plaintiff testified that the principal and other teachers were aware of the teacher’s inappropriate behavior, which occurred multiple times throughout the school year in a classroom on the defendants’ premises during school hours … . J.J. v Mineola Sch. Dist., 2024 NY Slip Op 05580, Second Dept 11-13-24

Practice Point: Here the plaintiff’s testimony that the principal and other teachers were aware of the teacher’s inappropriate behavior which occurred multiple times in a classroom was enough to prevent the school from making out a prima facie case that it did not have constructive notice of the teacher’s alleged propensity.

 

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