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THE NEARLY THREE-YEAR GAP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF’S KNEE SURGERY AND HIS SEEING THE SURGEON TO COMPLAIN OF KNEE PAIN DID NOT PRECLUDE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact about whether the continuous treatment doctrine applies to render the action timely. Plaintiff had knee surgery and did not see the surgeon again for nearly three years when he experienced pain. He had not seen any other orthopedic surgeons in the interim:

Defendants fail to establish that plaintiff’s claims involving treatment of her right knee before May 21, 2016 are time-barred. Given the evidence of “an ongoing relationship of trust and confidence between the patient and physician,” the record presents disputed issues of fact regarding whether the continuous treatment doctrine applies, thus precluding dismissal at this stage of the litigation … . The 34-month gap between the one-year postoperative follow-up visit after plaintiff’s right total knee replacement and her next complaint to defendant Dr. Steven B. Haas, M.D. about pain in his right knee does not prevent application of the doctrine as a matter of law, as plaintiff visited no orthopedic surgeon other than defendant Dr. Haas during that period, and she returned to Dr. Haas to address increased pain in her right knee, which even he determined would require revision surgery. Karanevich-Dono v Haas, 2024 NY Slip Op 05137, First Dept 10-17-24

Practice Point: Plaintiff had knee surgery and did not see the surgeon again for nearly three years to complain of knee pain. Plaintiff did not see any other orthopedic surgeon in the interim. There was a question of fact whether the continuous treatment doctrine applied to render the medial malpractice action timely.

 

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