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ALTHOUGH THE MEDICATION DISPENSED BY DEFENDANT PHARMACY WAS PRESCRIBED, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE MEDICATION WAS CLEARLY CONTRAINDICATED; THE PHARMACIST MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMSSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the pharmacist malpractice lawsuit should not have been dismissed, despite the fact that the medication was duly prescribed, criteria explained:

“On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable theory” … .

“[W]hen a pharmacist has demonstrated that he or she did not undertake to exercise any independent professional judgment in filling and dispensing prescription medication, that pharmacist cannot be held liable for negligence in the absence of evidence that he or she failed to fill the prescription precisely as directed by the prescribing physician or that the prescription was so clearly contraindicated that ordinary prudence required the pharmacist to take additional measures before dispensing the medication” … . Here, the amended complaint does not allege that the pharmacy exercised independent professional judgment or that it did not fill the prescriptions as directed by Gibson. Nevertheless, accepting the facts as alleged in the amended complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the amended complaint sufficiently alleges that the prescriptions were so clearly contraindicated that ordinary prudence required the pharmacy to take additional measures before dispensing the medication. Bistrian v Gibson, 2024 NY Slip Op 04303, Second Dept 8-28-24

Practice Point: Usually a pharmacist cannot be held liable for dispensing a duly prescribed medication (as was the case here), but the allegation that the medication was clearly contraindicated was deemed sufficient to state a cause of action for pharmacist malpractice.

 

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