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DEBRIS LEFT BEHIND AFTER WORK ON ANOTHER PROJECT WAS NOT “INTEGRAL” TO THE WORK PLAINTIFF WAS PERFORMING WHEN HE TRIPPED AND FELL; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CERTAIN LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION BASED UPON INDUSTRIAL CODE VIOLATIONS; IN ADDITION THE CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DEBRIS; THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on certain Labor Law 241(6) causes of action and the city’s motion to dismiss the Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence claims should not have been granted. Plaintiff tripped on discarded plastic and rock debris from prior sidewalk demolition and construction. Plaintiff was working on reconstruction of a sidewalk bridge when he fell. Therefore the plastic and rock debris did not constitute material integral to the work plaintiff was performing as Supreme Court had held. In addition, although the city did not exercise supervisory control over the work, the Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence causes of action should not have been dismissed because the city did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice of the dangerous condition created by the debris:

The plastic and the rock were not integral to the work performed by plaintiff or his coworkers because it constituted an accumulation of debris from previous work that was left in a “passageway” or “working area” which should have been kept free of debris ​… . * * *​

The “task at hand” did not involve demolition. It is uncontested that plaintiff and his coworkers were dismantling and rebuilding a sidewalk bridge at a new location and that plaintiff fell when he slipped and tripped while manually transporting a heavy beam to the new location. While it is undisputed that Padilla was a general contractor that did demolition work, the court’s overly broad view of the integral to the work defense reads [Industrial Code] sections 23-1.7(e)(1) and (2) out of existence. Lourenco v City of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 03540, First Dept 6-27-24

Practice Point: Debris left over from another job was not “integral” to the work being performed at the time of plaintiff’s fall, therefore the presence of the debris violated certain provisions of the Industrial Code.​

Practice Point: Although the city did not exercise supervisory control over the work, it did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Therefore the Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence causes of action should not have been dismissed.

 

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