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THE VICTIM DIED BY STRANGULATION; THE DEFENSE WAS DEFENDANT DID NOT INTEND TO KILL; THE VICTIM’S HEARSAY STATEMENTS ABOUT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WERE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW THE DEFENDANT’S, AS OPPOSED TO THE VICTIM’S, STATE OF MIND; CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s murder conviction, determined the victim’s hearsay statements about domestic violence should not have been admitted. There was no applicable exception the the hearsay rule and Molineux evidence of prior bad acts must be in admissible form. The victim died of strangulation. The defense argued defendant did not intend to kill the victim, his girlfriend:

… [T]he admission into evidence of prior statements of the victim regarding instances of domestic violence involving the defendant as proof of murder in the second degree, was error which may not be deemed harmless. This hearsay evidence was admitted, purportedly not for its truth, but to establish the victim’s state of mind, the nature of the parties’ relationship, the defendant’s motive and intent, and the absence of an accident. The victim’s state of mind may be an issue in certain circumstances, warranting the admission of hearsay evidence on that issue pursuant to a recognized hearsay exception … , but it was not at issue in this case. Rather, the evidence was used to establish the defendant’s state of mind, based upon the victim’s characterization of the defendant’s conduct and the acceptance of that characterization for its truth. In People v Brooks (31 NY3d 939, 942), the Court of Appeals ruled that a “witness’s testimony as to the victim’s statement that defendant had previously threatened her constituted double hearsay and was not properly admitted pursuant to any exceptions to the hearsay rule. . . . Nor is there any blanket hearsay exception providing for use of such statements as ‘background’ in domestic violence prosecutions” (citation omitted). Assuming arguendo that evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts was admissible under People v Molineux (168 NY 264]) and its progeny, “there is no Molineux exception to the rule against hearsay . . . . [S]uch evidence must still be in admissible form” … . This purported evidence of the defendant’s state of mind, in this case where intent became the primary issue, was not in admissible form. Thus, the admission of that evidence was error. The error cannot be deemed harmless because the evidence of the defendant’s intent was not overwhelming … . People v Rivers, 2024 NY Slip Op 01731, Second Dept 3-17-24

Practice Point: Here the murder victim’s hearsay statements about domestic violence were allowed in evidence to show the defendant’s, not the victim’s, state of mind. The statements were not admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule. The error was not harmless because the defendant argued he did not intend to kill the victim (who died by strangulation).

 

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