You are here: / / BECAUSE MOTHER HAD RELINQUISHED CUSTODY OF THE CHILD TO THE MATERNAL GRANDFATHER...
,

BECAUSE MOTHER HAD RELINQUISHED CUSTODY OF THE CHILD TO THE MATERNAL GRANDFATHER FOR MORE THAN 24 MONTHS, THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE HELD A “BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD” HEARING BEFORE RULING ON MOTHER’S PETITION FOR SOLE CUSTODY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the maternal grandfather, who had custody of the child for more than 24 months with the consent of mother, demonstrated “extraordinary circumstances’ which warrant a “best interests of the child” hearing before ruling on mother’s petition for custody:

Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72, “an ‘extended disruption of custody’ between the child and the parent ‘shall constitute an extraordinary circumstance'” … . “The statute defines ‘extended disruption of custody’ as including, but not limited to, ‘a prolonged separation of the respondent . . . and the child for at least twenty-four continuous months during which the parent voluntarily relinquished care and control of the child and the child resided in the household of the petitioner grandparent or grandparents'” … . “Where extraordinary circumstances are present, the court must then consider the best interests of the child in awarding custody” … .

… [T]he maternal grandfather sustained his burden of demonstrating the existence of extraordinary circumstances. The evidence at the hearing established a prolonged separation of the subject child from the mother for more than 24 continuous months, during which the mother voluntarily relinquished care and control of the child and the child resided in the household of the maternal grandfather … . Matter of Elisa F. v Daniel D., 2024 NY Slip Op 01306, Second Dept 3-13-24

Practice Point: Here the child, with mother’s consent, was in the custody of the maternal grandfather for more than 24 months before mother brought the petition for sole custody. The maternal grandfather’s custody of the child for mote than 24 months constituted “extraordinary circumstances” warranting a “best interests of the child” hearing before ruling on mother’s petition.

 

You might also like
Unlicensed Contractor Could Not Sue for Breach of Contract or Quantum Meruit
Text Messages Authenticated Because They “Made No Sense” Unless Defendant Sent Them
THE REFEREE’S FINDINGS WERE BASED UPON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PETITION FOR GUARDIANSHIP AND MADE FINDINGS ALLOWING CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS.
THE DRAM SHOP ACT DOES NOT CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IN FAVOR OF THE INTOXICATED PERSON (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF-STUDENT WAS WATCHING FOOTBALL PRACTICE FROM THE SIDELINES WHEN A BLOCKING SLED, PUSHED BY SEVERAL PLAYERS, VEERED OFF TO THE SIDE AND RAN OVER PLAINTIFF’S FOOT, THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK DOCTRINE APPLIES TO SPECTATORS, THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
SCHOOL OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO STUDENT STRUCK BY A CAR AFTER LEAVING THE SCHOOL WITH PERMISSION.
ALTHOUGH THE PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT INITIATE PROCEEDINGS TO TAKE A JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFENDANTS’ DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE DEFENDANTS HAD FILED AN UNTIMELY ANSWER WHICH WAIVED THE DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO SEEK DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215 (C) (SECOND DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

NOT ALL REAR-END COLLISIONS ARE SOLELY THE FAULT OF THE REAR DRIVER; HERE PLAINTIFF,... IN THIS ACTION BY A PROPERTY OWNER WHO LOST THE PROPERTY TO FORECLOSURE: (1)...