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FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE CASE BECAUSE THE APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE AN “INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP” WITH THE SUBJECT CHILDREN WITHIN THE MEANING OF FAMILY COURT ACT 812 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction in this family offense case because the appellant did not have an “intimate relationship” with the subject children within the meaning of Family Court Act 812:

The “Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, constrained to exercise only those powers granted to it by the State Constitution or by statute” … . Pursuant to Family Court Act § 812(1), the Family Court’s jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is limited to certain prescribed acts that occur “between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household” … . “[M]embers of the same family or household” include, among others, “persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time” … . “Expressly excluded from the ambit of ‘intimate relationship’ are ‘casual acquaintance[s]’ and ‘ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts'” … . “Beyond those delineated exclusions, what qualifies as an intimate relationship within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e) is determined on a case-by-case basis, and the factors a court may consider include ‘the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship'” … .

Here, the appellant and the subject children have no direct relationship, and the appellant was only connected to the subject children through her children, who were the half-siblings of three of the subject children. The appellant and the subject children do not reside together and there was no evidence that they have any direct interaction with each other. Accordingly, there is no “intimate relationship” between the appellant and the subject children within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e) … . Matter of Watson v Brown, 2024 NY Slip Op 01191, Second Dept 3-6-24

Practice Point: In order for Family Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a family offense proceeding, the respondent must have an “intimate relationship” with the victims within the meaning of Family Court Act 812. The criteria for an “intimate relationship,” which was absent here, are explained in some detail.

 

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