You are here: / / DEFENDANT’S INNOCENT TEMPORARY POSSESSION OF A WEAPON WAS THE RESULT...
,

DEFENDANT’S INNOCENT TEMPORARY POSSESSION OF A WEAPON WAS THE RESULT OF HIS DISARMING A MAN WHO WAS ASSAULTING THE MAN’S WIFE; THE POSSESSION-OF-A-WEAPON CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mendez, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined defendant’s temporary possession of a weapon was not “criminal.” Defendant took the weapon from his friend, Moscoso, who was assaulting his (Moscoso’s) wife in an effort to protect her:

… [T]he evidence established that defendant’s possession of the weapon after disarming Moscoso was incidental, temporary, and lawful, and that he did not use the weapon in a dangerous manner. The trial court instructed the jury on “temporary and lawful possession of a weapon” by giving the charge as it appears in the Criminal Jury Instructions … which states in relevant part:

“A person has innocent possession of a weapon when that person comes into possession of the weapon in an excusable manner, and maintains possession, or intends to maintain possession, of the weapon only long enough to dispose of it safely.”

The charge does not define “safely.” Instead, it provides a list of non-dispositive factors for the jury to consider — essentially an “amalgam of elements” — with only some relating to how the defendant disposed of the weapon, suggesting that trial courts should expand on or alter the charge where necessary to fit the facts of the case … . People v Ramirez, 2024 NY Slip Op 00390, First Dept 1-30-24

Practice Point: This case has everything you could ever need to know about innocent temporary possession of a weapon.

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF’S STATE AND CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL; THE IDENTICAL CLAIMS UNDER FEDERAL LAW WERE DISMISSED IN FEDERAL COURT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT).
Contract Provision Protected Contractee from Damages for Delay Caused by Regulators​
THERE WERE NO GROUNDS TO DISTURB THE FACTUAL FINDINGS MADE BY THE JUDGE IN THIS BENCH TRIAL OF A FORECLOSURE ACTION, TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE FINDINGS WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE FINDING MOTHER WAS MENTALLY ILL WAS NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT, BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA THE COURT DEEMED THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO BE A REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND HEARD THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).
THE SENTENCE FOR MANSLAUGHTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN BASED UPON THE INTENT TO KILL WHICH IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME; THE SENTENCES FOR MANSLAUGHTER AND POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED CONSECUTIVELY; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING (FIRST DEPT).
ATTORNEY’S FEES RECOVERABLE UNDER AN ACCOUNT-STATED THEORY DESPITE TERMINATION OF THE ATTORNY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP (FIRST DEPT).
THE PROPERTY OWNERS AND THE SECURITY COMPANY WERE PROPERLY FOUND LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SEVERE INJURIES CAUSED BY TWELVE-YEAR-OLD BOYS WHO THREW A SHOPPING CART OVER A FOURTH FLOOR RAILING STRIKING PLAINTIFF ON THE GROUND BELOW (FIRST DEPT).
THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS SPECIFICALLY TARGETED FOR A HOME INVASION DID NOT PRECLUDE A FINDING THAT INADEQUATE BUILDING SECURITY WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE PROSECUTOR AND THE JUDGE AGREED DEFENDANT’S ALFORD PLEA WOULD BE PREMISED... DEFENDANT OPENED THE DRIVER’S-SIDE DOOR OF HIS PARKED CAR WITHOUT MAKING...