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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS WORKING ON DEFENDANT’S PRIVATE RESIDENCE WHEN INJURED, THE HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION TO LABOR LAW 241(6) LIABILITY MAY NOT APPLY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS EMPLOYED AS A CARPENTER BY DEFENDANT AND DEFENDANT MAY HAVE BEEN DIRECTING AND SUPERVISING THE WORK; SIMILARLY, DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant did not eliminate questions of fact about whether the homeowner’s exemption applied to the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action and whether he was liable under the Labor Law 200 and common law negligence causes of action. Although the plaintiff was working on defendant’s private residence, plaintiff was employed as a carpenter by defendant:

Although the defendant demonstrated that the work being performed at his single-family home was directly related to its residential use … , the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that he did not direct or control the plaintiff’s work. In support of his motion, the defendant submitted, among other things, a transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, in which the plaintiff testified that, at the time of the accident, the defendant owned a business that employed the plaintiff to perform carpentry work on decks and that the defendant instructed the plaintiff on which boards to remove and replace at the defendant’s home. The plaintiff also testified that the defendant provided all of the materials and tools that the plaintiff used for the work at the defendant’s home. Thus, the defendant’s submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether he directed or controlled the plaintiff’s work … . * * *

… [T]he plaintiff’s accident arose from the means and methods of the work, not from a dangerous premises condition …. . [Defendant] failed to establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action, since he failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether he had the authority to supervise or control the plaintiff’s work … . Walsh v Kenny, 2023 NY Slip Op 04791, Second Dept 9-27-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff was working on his employer’s (the defendant’s) private residence when injured. The defendant provided the materials and there was evidence he supervised the work. Therefore questions of fact precluded summary judgment on the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action (pursuant to the homeowner’s exemption to the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action), as well as on the Labor Law 200 and common law negligence causes of action.

 

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