You are here: / / PLAINTIFF WAS RIDING HER BICYCLE ON A SIDEWALK WHEN SHE COLLIDED WITH DEFENDANT’S...

PLAINTIFF WAS RIDING HER BICYCLE ON A SIDEWALK WHEN SHE COLLIDED WITH DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE AS DEFENDANT WAS ATTEMPTING TO PULL OUT OF A PARKING LOT; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this bicycle-vehicle collision case should not have been granted. Apparently plaintiff was riding on the sidewalk and collided with defendant’s vehicle as it was attempting to pull out of a parking lot:

The plaintiff Jamie Heaney (hereinafter the plaintiff) alleges she was operating a bicycle on a sidewalk when she collided with the defendant’s vehicle, which was attempting to exit from a parking lot … .

“A defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident” … . “There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident” … , and the issue of proximate cause is generally one for the jury … . Here, the defendant’s vehicle had pulled out from a parking lot and came to a stop immediately prior to the impact. The defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the presence of his vehicle on the sidewalk merely furnished the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the event but was not one of its causes … . Heaney v Kahn, 2020 NY Slip Op 01333, Second Dept 2-26-20

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH THE PARKING/STORAGE AREA WHERE CLAIMANT WAS INJURED WAS NOT ON THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT NEXUS BETWEEN THE PARKING/STORAGE AREA AND THE CONSTRUCTION SITE SUCH THAT CLAIMANT’S PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT EXTENDED TO THE PARKING/STORAGE AREA (THIRD DEPT).
Evidence which Should Have Been Presented In the People’s Direct Case Should Not Have Been Allowed in Rebuttal
FAMILY OFFENSES OF AGGRAVATED HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT THIRD NOT SUPPORTED BY PROOF OF PHYSICAL INJURY (SECOND DEPT).
FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE CHILD TO APPLY FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SECOND DEPT).
Mistaken Classification of Property Resulting In a Much Too Large Tax Bill Was a “Clerical Error” Which Could Be Corrected by the City Department of Finance—No Need for Property Owner to Commence a Tax Certiorari Proceeding
Prosecutor’s Remarks in Summation, in Combination with the Erroneous Admission of Portions of a Recorded Phone Call Made by the Defendant from Jail, Warranted Reversal
AN EMAIL EXCHANGE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO RESTART THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN OTHERWISE TIME-BARRED DEBT PURSUANT TO GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 17-101 (SECOND DEPT).
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO EFFECT CIVIL ADMINISTRATIVE ARRESTS PURSUANT TO ICE DETAINERS, IMMIGRATION LAW VIOLATIONS ARE NOT CRIMES, HABEAS CORPUS PETITION GRANTED TO FRANCES, A CITIZEN OF INDIA WHO WAS HELD IN A COUNTY JAIL OSTENSIBLY PURSUANT TO AN ICE DETAINER, EVEN THOUGH FRANCES IS NO LONGER IN THE CUSTODY OF THE COUNTY, THE PETITIONER’S CIRCUMSTANCE IS LIKELY TO RECUR AND THE APPEAL WAS CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE... EXPERT WITNESSES CORROBORATED THE CHILD’S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS IN THIS...