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THE RELEASE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF BEFORE TAKING A MANDATORY COLLEGE FITNESS-EDUCATION COURSE PRECLUDED HER LAWSUIT AGAINST THE COLLEGE ALLEGING INJURIES SUSTAINED TAKING THE COURSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the release signed by the plaintiff precluded her suit against defendant community college (DCC) for alleged injuries sustained in a mandatory fitness education course:

The plaintiff enrolled in a wellness and fitness education course, which was a mandatory course that had to be taken as part of her general studies degree program at Dutchess Community College. The plaintiff informed the course instructor of her prior back injuries, and signed a release which, in relevant part, “discharge[d] Dutchess Community College from all liability for . . . any claim of injury to [the plaintiff’s] person . . . whether harm is caused by the negligence of the releasees or otherwise.” The release further provided that it was “intended to be broad and inclusive in keeping with state laws.” * * *

“Where the language of an exculpatory agreement expresses in unequivocal terms the intention of the parties to relieve a defendant of liability for its own negligence, the agreement will be enforced” … . “Although a defendant has the initial burden of establishing that it has been released from any claims, a signed release ‘shifts the burden of going forward . . . to the [plaintiff] to show that there has been fraud, duress or some other fact which will be sufficient to void the release'” … . Sjogren v Board of Trustees of Dutchess Community Coll., 2023 NY Slip Op 02551, Second Dept 5-10-23

Practice Point: An unambiguous release will preclude a lawsuit absent fraud sufficient to void the agreement.

 

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