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HERE THE CLAIMANT WAS DEEMED DISABLED BY AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (CANCER) CAUSED BY EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS; THE EMPLOYER RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPENSATION IS THE LAST EMPLOYER WHERE THE NATURE OF THE WORK EXPOSED CLAIMANT TO ASBESTOS, NOT NECESSARILY THE EMPLOYER AT THE TIME THE CANCER WAS DIAGNOSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board and remitting the matter, determined the Board did not use the correct criteria for determining the employer or insurer responsible to pay for claimant’s disability due to occupational disease, i.e., lung cancer caused by asbestos exposure:

… [I]n determining that the carrier was on the risk for the claim, the Board premised its finding solely on the date of disablement, or October 15, 2019, instead of evidence concerning the timing of claimant’s contraction of lung cancer and the “employer who last employed the employee in the employment to the nature of which the disease was due and in which it was contracted” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 44). This reasoning resulted in a misapplication of Workers’ Compensation Law § 44. “Simply put, disability while employed by a previous employer is not a prerequisite to a finding that a claimant contracted an occupational disease while employed by that employer” … . As such, we reverse and remit for a determination in the first instance of the proper employer and/or carrier on the risk utilizing the correct standard set forth in Workers’ Compensation Law § 44 … . Matter of Candela v Skanska USA Bldg. Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 07113, Third Dept 12-15-22

Practice Point: Here the occupational disease which disabled claimant was cancer caused by exposure to asbestos. The employer responsible for compensation is the last employer where the nature of the work exposed claimant to asbestos, not necessarily the employer at the time the cancer was diagnosed.

 

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