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DEFENDANTS’ CAR WAS STOPPED IN THE SHOULDER LANE FOR A NON-EMERGENCY REASON WHEN THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER STRUCK IT FROM BEHIND; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER STOPPING THE CAR IN THE SHOULDER LANE FOR A NON-EMERGENCY REASON WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (AS OPPOSED TO MERELY FURNISHING THE OCCASION FOR THE ACCIDENT?) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the Feder defendants were not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint in this rear-end collision traffic-accident case. Plaintiff was a passenger in a car when the driver pulled into the shoulder lane because a speeding car crossed his lane. The Feder defendants’ car was stopped in the shoulder lane and the car in which plaintiff was a passenger struck it. The Feder defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because there were questions of fact whether stopping in the shoulder lane for a non-emergency reason constituted a proximate cause of the accident (as opposed to merely furnishing the occasion for the accident?):

“A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision” … . However, “[t]he mere fact that other persons share some responsibility for plaintiff’s harm does not absolve defendant from liability because there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury” … .. “Generally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause” … .

Here, the Feder defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them. The Feder defendants’ own submissions raised triable issues of fact as to whether Abraham Feder’s conduct in stopping on the shoulder of the highway for a non-emergency purpose imposed upon them a duty of reasonable care to warn other drivers of the hazard posed by their stopped vehicle, and whether their failure to exercise reasonable care was a proximate cause of the accident … . Georgiadis v Feder, 2022 NY Slip Op 06690, Second Dept 11-23-22

Practice Point: Here defendants’ car was stopped in the shoulder lane for a nonemergency reason when the car in which plaintiff was a passenger struck it from behind. The Second Department held there were questions of fact about whether the car stopped in the shoulder lane was a proximate cause of the accident. The case illustrates the fine line between “furnishing the occasion for an accident,” which is not actionable, and a “proximate cause” of an accident, which is.

 

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