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THE NOTE REQUIRED THE APPLICATION OF FLORIDA SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAW TO THE “TERMS OF THE DOCUMENTS” BUT SPECIFICALLY CONTEMPLATED A SUIT IN EITHER NEW YORK OR FLORIDA; THEREFORE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE INTERPRETED THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISIONS TO RULE OUT A NEW YORK LAWSUIT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the terms of the note which required the application of Florida law did not preclude bringing the action in New York. The language in the note indicated the parties intended suit to be brought either in New York or Florida:

[Supreme Court] stated in its decision that, “having elected to have the ‘procedur[al] laws of the State of Florida’ apply exclusively in this action, the [p]laintiff could not rely on any of the provisions of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules in prosecuting this action.” The court relied on CPLR 101, which the court quoted in its decision as providing, in pertinent part, that ” ‘[t]he civil practice law and rules shall govern the procedure in civil judicial proceedings in all courts of the state and before all judges, except where the procedure is regulated by inconsistent statute’ ” … . The court … concluded that, due to the perceived conflict between the contractual choice-of-law provisions and CPLR 101, it could not grant the [plaintiff’s summary judgment] motion. * * *

“Contractual ‘[c]hoice of law provisions typically apply to only substantive issues’ ” … , although parties can agree otherwise. Here, the note provides that “[t]he terms” of the documents are to be governed by the substantive and procedural rules of Florida, but that does not establish that the rules of Florida were intended to govern the procedures of the New York State court system, which would effectively preclude any action on the note in New York. Indeed, the note itself provides that venue for any action related to the note may be in either “Onondaga County, New York or Broward County, Florida.” Thus, the parties anticipated that New York courts could and would be able to handle a judicial action related to the note … . Bankers Healthcare Group, LLC v Pasumbal, 2022 NY Slip Op 06334, Fourth Dept 11-10-22

Practice Point: The choice of law provisions in the note required the application of Florida substantive and procedural law to the “terms of the documents” and also stated suit could be brought in either New York or Florida. Supreme Court should not have interpreted the choice of law provisions to rule out a New York lawsuit.

 

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