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IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION, PRIOR APPELLATE RULING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID BECAME THE LAW OF THE CASE; TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THE WARRANT VALID AND GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE POLICE REVERSED.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, over a two-justice dissent, determined the First Department’s prior ruling that a search warrant was invalid was the law of the case. The trial court had ruled new evidence demonstrated the validity of the warrant and granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendants (the city and police officers who procured and executed the search warrant). The plaintiffs, who had been pushed to the floor at gunpoint, handcuffed, and held for three hours while their apartment was searched (and trashed), sued alleging the violation of their civil rights:

This case gives us the opportunity to emphasize that when an issue is specifically decided on a motion for summary judgment, that determination is the law of the case. As such, the trial court, as well as the parties, are bound by it “absent a showing of subsequent evidence or change of law” … . Applying this rule to the case at hand, we specifically found in Delgado v City of New York (86 AD3d 502, 508 [1st Dept 2011] [Delgado I]), that the no-knock search warrant at issue was not valid. Thus, the trial court was bound by that determination absent the introduction of subsequent evidence to show otherwise. The evidence that was introduced at trial on the validity of the warrant, however, was not significantly different from what was previously before the court on the motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial court erred in deeming the warrant valid and granting defendants’ motion for a directed verdict in their favor. * * *

Whether this Court’s conclusion regarding the validity of the search warrant in Delgado I was erroneously reached is irrelevant. The law of the case precluded the trial court from re-examining the issue (see Carmona, 92 AD3d at 492-493), and it was therefore bound by our conclusion regardless of its views on our analysis … .

At the very least, the issue as to the validity of the search warrant should have gone before the jury since the additional evidence adduced at trial did not significantly alter our analysis. Instead, acting essentially as an appellate court, the trial court effectively reversed this Court’s finding on the validity of the warrant. Delgado v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 06185, 1st Dept 9-27-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION, PRIOR APPELLATE RULING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID BECAME THE LAW OF THE CASE; TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THE WARRANT VALID AND GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE POLICE REVERSED)/CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (PRIOR APPELLATE RULING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID BECAME THE LAW OF THE CASE; TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THE WARRANT VALID AND GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE POLICE REVERSED)/CRIMINAL LAW ((IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION, PRIOR APPELLATE RULING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID BECAME THE LAW OF THE CASE; TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THE WARRANT VALID AND GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE POLICE REVERSED)/LAW OF THE CASE (IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION, PRIOR APPELLATE RULING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID BECAME THE LAW OF THE CASE; TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THE WARRANT VALID AND GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE POLICE REVERSED)

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