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AMENDMENT TO STATUTE CHANGING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTION ON A PAYMENT BOND DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined an action by a subcontractor seeking payment under a payment bond for environmental clean-up work was time-barred. Plaintiff subcontractor had submitted invoices to the contractor which were not paid. Whether the action on the payment bond was time-barred depended upon whether an amendment to State Finance Law 137 applied retroactively. The court found the amendment did not apply retroactively and explained the analytical criteria:

” In determining whether statutory enactments should be given retroactive effect, there are two axioms of statutory interpretation'”  … . ” Amendments are presumed to have prospective application unless the Legislature’s preference for retroactivity is explicitly stated or clearly indicated. However, remedial legislation should be given retroactive effect in order to effectuate its beneficial purpose'” … . ” These axioms are helpful guideposts, but the reach of the statute ultimately becomes a matter of judgment made upon review of the legislative goal'” … .

Here, the Legislature did not explicitly state or clearly indicate, either in the amendment itself or in the legislative materials, that the 2011 amendment should be applied retroactively … . Thus, “we presume at the outset that the amendment was to have prospective application” … . Additionally, the 2011 amendment did not create a new right or a new class of individuals who could assert a cause of action under a payment bond. Instead, the amendment was simply intended to clarify the limitations period for bringing a payment bond claim. Given these circumstances, the amendment cannot be characterized as remedial, and need not be applied retroactively to achieve its purpose … . Clean Earth of N. Jersey, Inc. v Northcoast Maintenance Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 06056, 2nd Dept 9-21-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (PAYMENT BOND,AMENDMENT TO STATUTE CHANGING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTION ON A PAYMENT BOND DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/CONTRACT LAW (PAYMENT BOND, AMENDMENT TO STATUTE CHANGING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTION ON A PAYMENT BOND DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/PAYMENT BOND (STATE FINANCE LAW, AMENDMENT TO STATUTE CHANGING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTION ON A PAYMENT BOND DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/STATE FINANCE LAW (PAYMENT BOND, AMENDMENT TO STATUTE CHANGING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTION ON A PAYMENT BOND DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/STATUTES (STATE FINANCE LAW, AMENDMENT TO STATUTE CHANGING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTION ON A PAYMENT BOND DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY, CRITERIA EXPLAINED

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