You are here: / / PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PROSECUTOR’S INITIAL STATEMENT...

PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PROSECUTOR’S INITIAL STATEMENT OF READINESS FOR TRIAL WAS ILLUSORY CLARIFIED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, over a concurrence in two of the three cases and a dissent in the third, articulated the procedure for determining whether a prosecutor’s off-calendar statement of readiness for trial was illusory. An illusory statement of readiness would not stop the speedy trial clock. The issue arises when an initial statement of readiness is followed by an indication the People are not ready for trial:

In each of these appeals, defendants moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) arguing that the People’s off-calendar statements of readiness were illusory because the People were not ready for trial at the next court appearance. The common issue left open in People v Sibblies (22 NY3d 1174 [2014]) — is whether, in the event of a change in the People’s readiness status, the People or the defendant have the burden of showing that a previously filed off-calendar statement of readiness is illusory. We hold that such a statement is presumed truthful and accurate; a presumption that can be rebutted by a defendant’s demonstration that the People were not, in fact, ready at the time the statement was filed. If the People announce that they are not ready after having filed an off-calendar statement of readiness, and the defendant challenges such statement — at a calendar call, in a CPL 30.30 motion, or both — the People must establish a valid reason for their change in readiness status to ensure that a sufficient record is made for the court to determine whether the delay is excludable. The defendant then bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating, based on the People’s proffered reasons and other relevant circumstances, that the prior statement of readiness was illusory. People v Brown, 2016 NY Slip Op 08482, CtApp 12-20-16

CRIMINAL LAW (PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PROSECUTOR’S INITIAL STATEMENT OF READINESS FOR TRIAL WAS ILLUSORY CLARIFIED)/SPEEDY TRIAL (PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PROSECUTOR’S INITIAL STATEMENT OF READINESS FOR TRIAL WAS ILLUSORY CLARIFIED)/STATEMENT OF READINESS (CRIMINAL LAW, SPEEDY TRIAL, PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PROSECUTOR’S INITIAL STATEMENT OF READINESS FOR TRIAL WAS ILLUSORY CLARIFIED)

You might also like
THE DRUGS IN DEFENDANT’S CAR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN IN “PLAIN VIEW” IF THE POLICE HAD NOT ILLEGALLY DETAINED DEFENDANT OUTSIDE THE CAR BEFORE LOOKING INSIDE THE CAR; SUPPRESSION GRANTED AND INDICTMENT DISMISSED; THREE-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP).
THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD PROPERLY DENIED BENEFITS FOR PTSD SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF EXPOSURE TO COVID IN THE WORKPLACE BECAUSE THERE WAS NOTHING UNIQUE ABOUT THE CLAIMANTS’ EXPOSURE AS OPPOSED TO THAT OF THE REST OF THE WORK FORCE; THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW HAS SINCE BEEN AMENDED TO CHANGE THE ANALYSIS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY SUCH THAT WHETHER A CLAIMANT SUFFERED STRESS GREATER THAN WHAT USUALLY OCCURS IN THE NORMAL WORK ENVIRONMENT IS NO LONGER A CONSIDERATION (CT APP).
Evidence of Prior Violent Act by Defendant Properly Admitted to Refute “Extreme Emotional Disturbance” Affirmative Defense
AFTER BREAKING UP A FIGHT BETWEEN TWO MEN ON THE STREET AND HANDCUFFING THEM, THE POLICE QUESTIONED DEFENDANT WITHOUT GIVING THE MIRANDA WARNINGS; DEFENDANT’S ADMISSION HE HAD PUNCHED THE VICTIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS HOWEVER (CT APP).
Six-Year Breach of Contract Statute of Limitations Applied to Third Party Beneficiaries (Here the Plaintiff Villages and Towns) of Contracts Between the Counties and the Defendant Sewer-Construction Companies
A NYC LOCAL LAW REQUIRING REDUCTIONS IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM LARGE BUILDINGS IS NOT PREEMPTED BY THE STATE’S CLIMATE LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION ACT (CT APP).
DECEDENT’S WORK-RELATED COVID DEATH ENTITLED DECEDENT’S DAUGHTER, DECEDENT’S “STATUTORY BENEFICIARY,” TO “ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS” UNDER A RECENT STATUTE; PETITIONER, DECEDENT’S PARTNER, WHO WAS DECEDENT’S “DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY” FOR “ORDINARY DEATH BENEFITS,” WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE “ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS” (CT APP).
ENTERPRISE CORRUPTION CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE ENTERPRISE AND HIS INTENT TO PARTICIPATE IN AFFAIRS OF THE ENTERPRISE (CT APP).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

NO STATE COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 RECORDINGS PLAYED BY RADIO... JURY INSTRUCTION TO CONTINUE DELIBERATIONS AFTER A NON-UNANIMOUS VERDICT WAS...