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TRANSCRIPT OF FAMILY COURT ACT 1028 HEARING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN USED AS A REPLACEMENT FOR AN ABUSE-NEGLECT FACT-FINDING HEARING BECAUSE THE PROOF REQUIREMENTS ARE DIFFERENT AND BECAUSE THERE WAS NO FINDING THAT THE WITNESS AT THE 1028 HEARING WAS UNAVAILABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the transcript of the Family Court Act 1028 hearing (seeking the quick return of a child temporarily removed pending a fact-finding hearing) should not have been used to replace the abuse/neglect fact-finding hearing because the proof requirements are different:

Family Court Act § 1028 permits a parent to apply for the return of a child who has been temporarily removed from the custody of the parent pending the fact-finding hearing on the issue of abuse or neglect … . “[A] section 1028 hearing is intended to give a parent an opportunity for a prompt reunion with the child, pending trial” … . In analyzing an application for a child’s return under Family Court Act § 1028, a court must engage in a test balancing the imminent risk with the best interests of the child and, where appropriate, the reasonable efforts made to avoid removal or continuing removal … . Section 1028 hearings, however, were not intended to replace fact-finding hearings, as the evidentiary standards are different. Family Court Act § 1046 provides that “only competent, material and relevant evidence may be admitted” at a fact-finding hearing, whereas evidence “[i]n a dispositional hearing and during all other stages of a proceeding under” Family Court Act article 10 need only be “material and relevant” … . A determination on an application pursuant to section 1028 “should not be taken as any indication of what ultimate determination should be made by the Family Court as to [a] petition alleging abuse and neglect” … . “At a fact-finding hearing, any determination that a child is an abused or neglected child must be based on a preponderance of the evidence” … .

CPLR 4517, which governs the admissibility of prior testimony in a civil action, is applicable here … , as the Family Court Act does not prescribe the issue of whether testimony from a prior hearing pursuant to Family Court Act article 10 may be admitted into evidence on the petitioner’s direct case in a fact-finding hearing. Pursuant to CPLR 4517(a)(3), prior trial testimony of a witness may be used by any party for any purpose against another party if the court finds that such witness is dead or otherwise unavailable. In this matter, the Family Court made no such finding.

Here, the Family Court should not have admitted into evidence at the fact-finding hearing transcripts of testimony from the hearing conducted pursuant to Family Court Act § 1028. As ACS now correctly concedes, the caseworker’s testimony at the prior hearing, which included hearsay statements, actually formed the basis of the court’s neglect finding at the subsequent fact-finding hearing. Matter of Louie L. V. (Virzhiniya T. V.), 2019 NY Slip Op 07592, Second Dept 10-23-19

 

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