You are here: / / PLAINTIFF’S ‘DENIAL OF A FAIR TRIAL’ ACTION PURSUANT...
,

PLAINTIFF’S ‘DENIAL OF A FAIR TRIAL’ ACTION PURSUANT TO 42 USC 1983 SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BEFORE PLAINTIFF’S CASE WAS CLOSED; THE MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT WAS PREMATURE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, EVEN IF PLAINTIFF’S ULTIMATE SUCCESS WAS UNLIKELY; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, setting aside the verdict, and ordering a new trial, determined that the motion for a directed verdict should not have been granted prior to the close the plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff had brought an action against the City of New York pursuant to 42 USC 1983 alleging he had not received a fair trial:

The denial of a fair trial claim is a stand alone cause of action (see e.g. Garnett v Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F3d 265, 278-279 [2d Cir 2016]), which should not have been dismissed prior to the conclusion of plaintiff’s case in chief. CPLR 4401 permits a party to move for a directed verdict “after the close of the evidence presented by an opposing party with respect to such cause of action or issue.” “[I]t is reversible error to grant a motion for a directed verdict prior to the close of the party’s case against whom a directed verdict is sought” … , even if the ultimate success of a plaintiff’s cause of action is unlikely … . Cromedy v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 07527, First Dept 10-22-19

 

You might also like
THE BATSON RECONSTRUCTION HEARING, HELD AFTER THE MATTER WAS SENT BACK BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF AN ADEQUATE RECORD FOR APPEAL, WAS ITSELF DEFICIENT, THE ORIGINAL PROSECUTOR DID NOT TESTIFY AND THE NOTES OF THE ORIGINAL PROSECUTOR WERE NOT PROVIDED TO THE COURT, CONVICTIONS REVERSED AND INDICTMENT DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
Re: a Third-Party Settlement, Consent of Special Fund Required Before Carrier Entitled to Reimbursement from Special Fund
Level Three Forcible Stop Not Justified, Convictions Reversed—Prior Arrest of One of the Defendants and the Fact that Both Defendants Were Running While Looking Back Over their Shoulders Was Not Enough to Justify the Forcible Stop
THE CONTRACTOR COULD NOT ESCAPE LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT OF THE SUBCONTRACTOR; THE PAY-WHEN-PAID CLAUSE IN THE CONTRACT IS INVALID; NOTHING IN THE CONTRACT INDICATED THE CONTRACTOR WAS ACTING SOLELY AS AN AGENT FOR THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT).
SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REMOVED THE INCAPACITATED PERSON’S (IP’S) SON AS GUARDIAN OF THE PROPERTY WITHOUT HOLDING A TESTIMONIAL HEARING, CRITERIA FOR REMOVAL EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).
NO NEED FOR ARRESTING OFFICER TO TESTIFY AT SUPPRESSION HEARING, INFERENCE OF MUTUAL COMMUNICATION APPLIED.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON PLAINTIFF’S ACCOUNT STATED CAUSE OF ACTION; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).
FIXING A LEAKY ROOF NOT ROUTINE MAINTENANCE, PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE APPEAL OF AN UNPRESERVED ISSUE DID NOT PRESENT A QUESTION OF LAW REVIEWABLE... INSTALLING WINDOW SHADES IS NOT ‘ALTERING’ WITHIN THE MEANING OF...