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SELLER’S ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT PROPERLY DISMISSED; THE CONTRACT WAS SUBJECT TO ATTORNEY APPROVAL BUT NO DEADLINE FOR ATTORNEY-APPROVAL WAS SET BY THE AGREEMENT; DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL INFORMED PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL THAT DEFENDANTS DID NOT WISH TO GO FORWARD WITH THE PURCHASE EITHER SEVEN OR NINE DAYS AFTER THE CONTRACT WAS EXECUTED, WHICH WAS DEEMED A REASONABLE TIME (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant-purchasers’ motion to dismiss the complaint seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase agreement was property granted. The agreement was subject to attorney approval and defendants’ attorney disapproved the contract either seven or nine days after the agreement was executed. There was no time-limit for attorney approval in the agreement, and seven or nine days were deemed a reasonable time:

… [T]he defendants established their entitlement to dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). “On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . “Moreover, where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the motion should not be granted unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it” … .

The evidentiary material submitted by the defendants in support of their motion demonstrated that the plaintiff had no cause of action against them. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the evidence conclusively established that the purchase agreement was unenforceable because it was subject to attorney approval, which was not given by the defendants’ attorney. As the purchase agreement contained no time limit within which approval was required “a reasonable time for cancellation thereunder is implied” … . Whether, as acknowledged by the defendants, it was seven days after the parties entered into the purchase agreement that the defendants’ attorney disapproved it, or as alleged by the plaintiff, it was nine days after the parties entered into the purchase agreement that the defendants’ attorney disapproved it, the time between the parties entering into the agreement and the disapproval was minimal, during which no prejudice would inure to the plaintiff, and was a reasonable time period as a matter of law. Makris v Boylan, 2019 NY Slip Op 06598, Second Dept 9-18-19

 

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