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THE DEFENDANT HOSPITAL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT A DOCTOR ORDERED THE RESTRAINT OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AND THEREFORE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, AS OPPOSED TO NEGLIGENCE, WAS THE APPROPRIATE THEORY; THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BASED UPON THE EXPIRATION OF THE 2 1/2 YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on statute of limitations grounds should not have been granted. Plaintiff’s decedent’s injuries were alleged to relate to defendant-hospital’s improper restraint of plaintiff’s decedent (apparently to keep him from getting up from his hospital bed). Defendant argued the 2 1/2 year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions had passed. The Second Department held that defendant did not demonstrate that a doctor had ordered the restraints; therefore the defendant had not made out a prima facie case that the action sounded in medical malpractice as opposed to negligence:

” The critical question in determining whether an action sounds in medical malpractice or simple negligence is the nature of the duty to the plaintiff which the defendant is alleged to have breached'” … . ” When the duty arises from the physician-patient relationship or is substantially related to medical treatment, the breach gives rise to an action sounding in medical malpractice, not simple negligence'” … . ” The distinction between ordinary negligence and malpractice turns on whether the acts or omissions complained of involve a matter of medical science or art requiring special skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons or whether the conduct complained of can instead be assessed on the basis of the common everyday experience of the trier of the facts'” … .

Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s claims were time-barred under the 2½-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions (see CPLR 214-a). Since the defendant did not present any evidence that a doctor ordered the decedent to be restrained at any point prior to or during the subject incident, the defendant failed to establish that the plaintiff’s claims related to medical treatment, as opposed to the failure of hospital staff to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to prevent harm to the decedent … . ​Wesolowski v St. Francis Hosp., 2019 NY Slip Op 06646, Second Dept 9-18-19

 

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