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TOWN LAW DID NOT PROHIBIT PETITIONER FROM RUNNING FOR TOWN JUSTICE IN TWO DIFFERENT TOWNS SIMULTANEOUSLY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the Town Law did not prohibit simultaneously running for Town Justice in two different towns:

At issue is the portion of Town Law § 20 (4) providing that “[n]o person shall be eligible to hold more than one elective town office.” Petitioner interprets this to mean that no person may hold more than one elective office, even if those offices are in separate towns. Bacon [respondent] asserts that this language prohibits a person from holding more than one elective office only within the same town. Because the quoted language is ambiguous and both proffered interpretations are reasonable, we must view the language in the context of the whole statute … . …

Viewing the prohibition in context, Town Law § 20 makes provision for town offices for each town, by class, and contains no other language suggesting that one person cannot fulfill elective town offices in more than one town. Moreover, the prohibition is contained in the same sentence as a provision allowing a town board to consolidate its own town offices and positions, strongly suggesting that the entire subdivision (4) of Town Law § 20 refers to what is permitted in an individual town. …

We further agree with Supreme Court that the offices of town justice in separate towns are not incompatible offices. …Serving as town justice in two separate towns involves jurisdiction over separate, defined geographic town boundaries and each town court thereof (see Town Law § 2). Moreover, the Legislature has expressly recognized that one person may, under certain circumstances, serve as town justice in more than one town (see UJCA 106 [2]; 106-a, 106-b). Although those circumstances are not present here, these statutes indicate the Legislature’s view that no conflict exists to prevent a person from serving as town justice in two towns simultaneously. Matter of Nichols v Bacon, 2019 NY Slip Op 06434, Third Dept 8-29-19

 

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