ADVERSE POSSESSION AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS LAKE FRONT PROPERTY DISPUTE, THE USE OF THE LAND WAS PERMISSIVE, NOT HOSTILE (FOURTH DEPT).
The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to dismiss defendants’ adverse possession affirmative defense should have been granted. The disputed land is a so-called stub trail which allows access to a lake and which is owned by a third-party (Hillcrest). Defendants’ use and maintenance of the property was deemed permissive (i.e., not hostile) as the stub trails were to be used by all the property owners in the subdivision for lake access:
We agree with plaintiff that it met its initial burden on the cross motion of establishing as a matter of law that defendants’ use of the disputed property was not hostile and instead was permissive … , and defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition … . The hostility element “is satisfied where an individual asserts a right to the property that is adverse to the title owner and also in opposition to the rights of the true owner’ ” … . ” Possession is hostile when it constitutes an actual invasion of or infringement upon the owner’s rights’ ” … . However, “[w]hen the entry upon land has been by permission or under some right or authority derived from the owner, adverse possession does not commence until such permission or authority has been repudiated and renounced and the possessor thereafter has assumed the attitude of hostility to any right in the real owner” … . “The purpose of the hostility requirement is to provide the title owner notice of the adverse claim through the unequivocal acts of the usurper’ ” … . …
The … deed demonstrated that defendants’ use of the disputed property was permissive pursuant to the terms of that deed, which allowed property owners around Rushford Lake to use the stub trail at issue that was owned by Hillcrest. The acts of defendants in mowing the lawn, removing weeds, adding fill to the area, and planting trees were fully consistent with the intent of the … deed, which was to allow property owners to use the trails and stub trails and improve them when needed. The acts of defendants did not give Hillcrest a cause of action in ejectment inasmuch as Hillcrest was required under the terms of the deed to allow property owners such as defendants to use and maintain the trail … . Parklands E., LLC v Spangenberg, 2019 NY Slip Op 05849, Fourth Dept 7-31-19