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FAMILY COURT PROPERLY TRANSFERRED THIS DERIVATIVE NEGLECT PROCEEDING TO THE UNKECHAUG INDIAN NATION PURSUANT TO THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT (ICWA) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Family Court properly transferred the derivative neglect proceeding to the Unkechaug Indian Nation pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA):

The ICWA provides that “the Indian custodian of the child and the Indian child’s tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point” in a proceeding to which the ICWA applies … . Congress authorized the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Interior Indian Affairs (hereinafter the DOI), to promulgate rules and regulations “as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [ICWA]” … . The current regulations define the term “child-custody proceeding” as “any action, other than an emergency proceeding, that may culminate in” foster-care placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, and adoptive placement … . “An action that may culminate in one of these four outcomes is considered a separate child-custody proceeding from an action that may culminate in a different one of these four outcomes” … . The DOI explained that “[t]he final rule uses the phrase may culminate in one of the following outcomes,’ rather than the less precise phrase involves,’ used in the draft rule, in order to make clear that ICWA requirements would apply to an action that may result in one of the placement outcomes, even if it ultimately does not. For example, ICWA would apply to an action where a court was considering a foster-care placement of a child, but ultimately decided to return the child to his parents. Thus, even though the action did not result in a foster-care placement, it may have culminated in such a placement and, therefore, should be considered a child-custody proceeding’ under the statute” … . Matter of Dupree M. (Samantha Q.), 2019 NY Slip Op 02523, Second Dept 4-3-19

 

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