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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE FAILURE TO UPDATE THE ADDRESS ON FILE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment should have been granted, despite defendant’s failure to update its address with the Secretary of State:

There was no evidence that the defendant received actual notice of the summons delivered to the Secretary of State, which does not constitute personal delivery, in time to defend this action ). Although the defendant did not explain why it failed to update its address with the Secretary of State, “there is no necessity for a defendant moving pursuant to CPLR 317 to show a reasonable excuse for its delay” … . Furthermore, there is no basis in the record to conclude that the defendant deliberately attempted to avoid service, especially since the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the defendant’s Westchester County… business address at least two months before the summons and complaint were filed in this action and, thus, could have attempted to serve the defendant personally pursuant to CPLR 311 … . Nor is there any evidence that the defendant was placed on notice that the address on file with the Secretary of State was incorrect … . Moreover, the defendant met its burden of demonstrating the existence of a potentially meritorious defense … . Berardi Stone Setting, Inc. v Stonewall Contr. Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 02053, Second Dept 3-20-19

 

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF ELEVATED... PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ACTION TO RECOVER PROCEEDS OF...