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LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, SERVED THREE YEARS AFTER THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DELAYED CHILD’S BIRTH, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEEMED TIMELY SERVED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determent the late notice of claim in this medical malpractice action should have been deemed timely served. The notice of claim was served in 2012 and the plaintiff-child was born in 2009. It became apparent in 2010 that the child was unable to bear weight on her legs and her development was delayed:

The record here indicates that the defendant was aware that the child’s condition was related to glucose levels, which were not measured at birth. Thus, the defendant acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim immediately after the incident, and well within the 90 day period after the claim arose … .

The delay in serving a notice of claim was also directly attributable to the child’s infancy, since it was not apparent that the child had suffered a permanent injury until after the 90-day period expired. When the child’s injuries became apparent, the plaintiff served a late notice of claim without leave of court. Although this Court has ruled that actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim cannot be inferred from a late notice of claim served without leave of the court … , in this case the late notice of claim generated a hearing pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h, where the defendant conducted an examination of the plaintiff and the essential facts constituting the claim were explore … . Feduniak v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. (Queens Hosp. Center), 2019 NY Slip Op 01564, Second Dept 3-6-19

 

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