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BANK’S POSSESSION OF THE NOTES CONSOLIDATED BY A CONSOLIDATION, EXTENSION AND MODIFICATION AGREEMENT (CEMA) CONFERRED STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION, POSSESSION OF THE ORIGINAL NOTES WAS NOT REQUIRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Tom, over a two-justice dissent. determined that defendants’ excuse for their default and their argument plaintiff bank (Wells Fargo) did not have standing were properly rejected by Supreme Court. The two dissenting justices agreed with defendants’ arguments. Defendants alleged in their motion to vacate the default that their attorney received the summary judgment motion, filed for bankruptcy and never responded to the motion. On the standing issue defendants argued that possession of the original 2005 and 2008 notes issued by a nonparty, not the subsequent Consolidation, Extension and Modification Agreement (CEMA) note, which consolidated the 2005 and 2008 notes, was required to confer standing:

… [T]he CEMA makes clear that the consolidated note superseded the original notes and is the operative document in this case. As did the plaintiff in Weiss v Phillips (157 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2017]), Wells Fargo seeks foreclosure based on the CEMA and consolidated note. As we held the plaintiff did in Weiss, Wells Fargo established its entitlement to relief by submitting the CEMA, consolidated note, unchallenged evidence that it is the holder of the consolidated note, and nonpayment of the loan by the borrowers. As we also held in Weiss, “In this case, because of the CEMA, standing is not an issue” and any absence of the underlying notes in this action is likewise accounted for by the CEMA … . In other words, “there is no legitimate question that [Wells Fargo] is the party entitled to enforce under the [consolidated] note, as evinced by . . . the CEMA” … . Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v Ho-Shing, 2019 NY Slip Op 00080, First Dept 1-8-19

 

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