CLAIMANT WAS CONVICTED OF MURDER AND AN UNRELATED ROBBERY WHICH WERE CHARGED IN A SINGLE INDICTMENT, AFTER A MAN CONFESSED TO THE MURDER, CLAIMANT’S MURDER CONVICTION WAS VACATED BUT THE ROBBERY CONVICTION REMAINED, REVERSING THE COURT OF CLAIMS, THE THIRD DEPT DETERMINED CLAIMANT WAS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR THE UNJUST MURDER CONVICTION AND RELATED IMPRISONMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined that claimant was entitled to compensation based upon his unjust conviction and imprisonment. Claimant’s murder conviction was vacated after another man confessed to the murder. Claimant had been charged with an unrelated robbery and the murder and robbery charges were joined in a single indictment. At the time the murder conviction was vacated, defendant pled guilty to the robbery. The state contended that the guilty plea to robbery precluded the claimant from compensation for the unjust murder conviction based upon the wording of the statute. The Third Department disagreed and interpreted the statute to allow compensation:

Court of Claims Act § 8-b allows individuals who are unjustly convicted and imprisoned to recover damages from defendant. To avoid dismissal of his claim, claimant was required to establish, as relevant here, that “he did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument” … . Claimant admitted that he committed acts charged in the indictment when he pleaded guilty to first degree robbery; however, he argues that the term “accusatory instrument” must be construed as applying only to the murder charges because they arose from an event that had no connection to the robbery. * * *

The term “accusatory instrument” could be literally construed to refer to the single indictment that charged claimant with crimes that arose from both events — the robbery and the subsequent murder. However, that conclusion must be measured against the intent of the legislation plainly expressed in the statute, which states that “[t]he [L]egislature finds and declares that innocent persons who have been wrongly convicted of crimes and subsequently imprisoned have been frustrated in seeking legal redress due to a variety of substantive and technical obstacles in the law and that such persons should have an available avenue of redress over and above the existing tort remedies to seek compensation for damages. The [L]egislature intends by enactment of the provisions of this section that those innocent persons who can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they were unjustly convicted and imprisoned be able to recover damages against [defendant]” … . Hence, “the linchpin of the statute is innocence” … . …

Under the unique facts of this case, a literal interpretation of “accusatory instrument” would lead to an unreasonable result starkly at odds with the clearly-expressed intent of the statute by denying recovery to claimant — who is indisputably innocent of the murder for which he was wrongfully convicted and imprisoned — solely because the charges arising from events now known to be unrelated were joined in a single indictment. Jones v State of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 08985, Third Dept 12-27-18