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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the statute of limitations. Defendant attorney (Weiss) were hired by plaintiff to bring a personal injury action. The legal malpractice action was filed more than three years after the statute had run on the personal injury case:

The complaint alleged that after the plaintiff executed the retainer agreement, Weis informed the plaintiff that the defendants were going to commence a personal injury and products liability action against the owner of the table saw, the manufacturer of the table saw, and ” everyone that touched the table saw'” until it was sold to the homeowner; the personal injury claim was ” worth millions of dollars'”; and it “would take up to seven (7) years to resolve” the personal injury claim. The complaint further alleged that from approximately September 2008 to late 2008, the plaintiff contacted Weis approximately every two weeks to inquire about the status of the personal injury claim. Weis allegedly advised the plaintiff to ” put the case on the back burner as it was going to take a long time to resolve,'” and that Weis ” had the plaintiff’s contact information,'” and ” if he needed the plaintiff, he would contact him.'” The complaint also alleged that between approximately late 2008 and July 2014, the plaintiff called the defendants’ law office every six to eight months to check on the status of the personal injury claim and spoke to a secretary each time. The complaint alleged that on July 29, 2014, the plaintiff went to the defendants’ office and asked Weis “when his court date was” because “it was getting close” to the seven-year “anniversary of the accident.” Weis allegedly told the plaintiff that he had ” no case,'” and that Weis thought the plaintiff had ” disappeared.'” …

… [T]the plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the running of the statute of limitations until July 29, 2014, when Weis allegedly informed the plaintiff that he did not have a case. Upon entering into the retainer agreement, the plaintiff and the defendants reasonably intended that their professional relationship of trust and confidence, focused upon the personal injury claim, would continue. The complaint adequately alleged that the plaintiff was “left with the reasonable impression” that the defendants were, “in fact, actively addressing [his] legal needs” until that date. The allegations in the complaint failed to reflect, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff knew or should have known that the defendants had withdrawn from representation on the personal injury claim more than three years before the legal malpractice action was commenced … . Schrull v Weis, 2018 NY Slip Op 07769, Second Dept 11-14-18

LEGAL MALPRACTICE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))

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