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STACKED SHEETROCK DID NOT PRESENT AN ELEVATION RELATED HAZARD AND DID NOT BLOCK A PASSAGEWAY, DEFENDANTS DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE STACKING OF THE SHEETROCK, LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6), 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the Labor Law 240 (1), 246 )1) and 200 causes of action were properly dismissed. The sheetrock which allegedly fell and struck plaintiff’s ankle was not an elevation-related hazard, did not block a passageway, and the defendants had not unloaded or stacked the sheetrock and did not exercise sufficient supervisory control to be liable in negligence:

The mere fact that a plaintiff was struck by an object that fell does not, by itself, give rise to liability under the statute … . Rather, a plaintiff must establish that “the object fell, while being hoisted or secured, because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute” … . That said, “where a plaintiff was exposed to the usual and ordinary dangers of a construction site, and not the extraordinary elevation risks envisioned by Labor Law § 240 (1), the plaintiff cannot recover under the statute” … . …

The record indicates … that the sheetrock was stacked on its long side on the ground before it fell and that plaintiff was on the same level as the sheetrock. …

Regarding plaintiff’s cause of action under Labor Law § 241 (6), it was incumbent upon plaintiff to show that defendants violated an Industrial Code provision that imposed a specific standard of conduct … . Plaintiff failed in that regard. The record discloses that the sheetrock was stored in the corner of a second-floor room and did not “obstruct any passageway, walkway, stairway or other thoroughfare” … .

Turning to plaintiff’s remaining claims, “Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty imposed upon . . . general contractors to maintain a safe work site” … . Where the injury stemmed from the methods and means in which a subcontractor performed its work, “there must be a showing of supervisory control and actual or constructive notice of the unsafe manner of performance” … . “Where a subcontractor creates a condition on the premises that results in an unreasonable risk of harm and that condition is a proximate cause of a worker’s injuries, then common-law negligence may be implicated” … . Wiley v Marjam Supply Co., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 07381, Third Dept 11-1-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (STACKED SHEETROCK DID NOT PRESENT AN ELEVATION RELATED HAZARD AND DID NOT BLOCK A PASSAGEWAY, DEFENDANTS DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE STACKING OF THE SHEETROCK, LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6), 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))

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