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STIPULATION ALLOWING MOTHER TO RELOCATE IS NOT DISPOSITIVE, HEARING TO ASSESS THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined that a stipulation allowing the mother to relocate cannot be put into effect absent a hearing examining the best interests of the children:

On March 13, 2014, the parties executed a custody stipulation that was so-ordered and incorporated, but not merged, into their judgment of divorce. The parties agreed to joint custody of their two children, with the mother being the primary residential custodian. The stipulation permitted the mother to relocate within 55 miles of her current residence without the express written permission of the father or a court order. …

The Family Court should not have granted the relief requested by the mother and summarily dismissed the petition pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1). “No agreement of the parties can bind the court to a disposition other than that which a weighing of all the factors involved shows to be in the child’s best interest” … . Thus, although the parties agreed in their stipulation that the mother could relocate to within 55 miles of her residence in Mamaroneck, such an agreement is not dispositive, but rather, is a factor to be considered along with all of the other factors a hearing court should consider when determining whether the relocation is in the best interests of the children … . Further, the father made an evidentiary showing that the mother’s proposed move might not be in the children’s best interests … . Where, as here, facts essential to the best interests analysis, and the circumstances surrounding such facts, remain in dispute, a hearing is require … . Matter of Jaimes v Gyerko, 2018 NY Slip Op 07125, Second Dept 10-24-18

FAMILY LAW (CUSTODY, RELOCATION, STIPULATION ALLOWING MOTHER TO RELOCATE IS NOT DISPOSITIVE, HEARING TO ASSESS THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT))/CUSTODY (RELOCATION, STIPULATION ALLOWING MOTHER TO RELOCATE IS NOT DISPOSITIVE, HEARING TO ASSESS THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT))/RELOCATION (FAMILY LAW, CUSTODY, STIPULATION ALLOWING MOTHER TO RELOCATE IS NOT DISPOSITIVE, HEARING TO ASSESS THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (FAMILY LAW, STIPULATION, CUSTODY, RELOCATION, STIPULATION ALLOWING MOTHER TO RELOCATE IS NOT DISPOSITIVE, HEARING TO ASSESS THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT))/STIPULATIONS (FAMILY LAW, CUSTODY, RELOCATION, STIPULATION ALLOWING MOTHER TO RELOCATE IS NOT DISPOSITIVE, HEARING TO ASSESS THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT))

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