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Circumstances Under Which Contractor Can Be Held Liable for Slip on Snow and Ice 

In this slip and fall case, the Second Department explained the circumstances under which a snow-and-ice-removal contractor can be held liable for injuries to third parties:

Generally, “a limited contractual obligation to provide snow removal services does not render the contractor liable in tort for the personal injuries of third parties” … . However, there are three recognized exceptions: “(1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his duties, launche[s] a force or instrument of harm; (2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party’s duties and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party’s duty to maintain the premises safely” … .  Santos v Deanco Servs, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 02065, 2012-02786, Index No 5927/09, 2nd Dept 3-27-13

 

 

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