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Assets Allegedly Wrongly Appropriated by Fiduciary Deemed “Asset-Transfers” for Purpose of Qualifying for Medicaid 

Pursuant to a power of attorney granted to Williams, petitioners’ decedent’s assets were transferred to joint accounts with Williams and decedent on the accounts.  Some of the funds were used by Williams for personal purposes.  When decedent applied for Medicaid benefits to pay for nursing home care, the benefits were denied by the Department of Health because it was determined that certain assets had been transferred for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid.  Petitioners brought an Article 78 proceeding arguing that Williams wrongly appropriated the assets and, therefore, the assets were not transferred to qualify for Medicaid.  In upholding the Department of Health’s asset-transfer finding, the Third Department wrote:

In this regard, petitioners contend that Williams breached her fiduciary duty to decedent and engaged in self-dealing, thus establishing that “the assets [in question] were transferred exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for medical assistance” and invoking the exception set forth in Social Services Law § 366 (5) (e) (4) (iii) (B). Although there arguably is evidence in the record that could support such a conclusion, given the existence of the joint checking accounts and the powers conferred upon Williams with respect to financial transactions, substantial evidence supports the Department of Health’s conclusion that petitioners failed to overcome the presumption that the stocks were sold and “the proceeds were transferred – at least in part – in order to qualify for Medicaid” … .Petitioners’ related assertion – that decedent lacked the mental capacity to manage his finances – is equally unavailing, as the record does not establish that decedent was incapacitated at the time the power of attorney was granted or the  joint accounts at issue  were  established. Under such circumstances, substantial evidence supports the Department of Health’s determination that petitioners  did  not  demonstrate  their entitlement to the claimed exception.  Matter of Conners… v Berlin …, 515536, 3rd Dept, 4-11-13

 

 

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