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New York Had Jurisdiction to Modify Pennsylvania Support Order

In finding that Family Court had jurisdiction to modify a Pennsylvania support order, the Second Department wrote:

The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (hereinafter UIFSA), codified in article 5-B of the Family Court Act, provides, in pertinent part, that a party seeking to modify and/or enforce a child support order issued in another state “shall register that order in this state” (Family Ct Act § 580-609). The parties agree that the support order governing the father’s child support obligations, which was issued by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania … (hereinafter the Pennsylvania support order) was registered in the Family Court, Suffolk County, pursuant to UIFSA …. The Family Court had jurisdiction to modify the Pennsylvania support order, upon registration thereof, since none of the parties resides in Pennsylvania, the petitioner mother does not reside in New York, and the respondent father, at all relevant times, was subject to personal jurisdiction in Suffolk County (see Family Ct Act § 580-611[a][1]). Matter of Gowda v Reddy, 2013 NY Slip Op 02577, 2011-06440, 2nd Dept, 4-17-13

 

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