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Scientific Expert Opinion Need Not Be Based Upon Textual Authority

In determining an expert’s testimony that an MRI would have revealed any injury caused by an epidural injection was properly admitted, the Second Department explained the criteria for the admission of (scientific) expert testimony:

In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, New York follows the rule of Frye v United States …  “that expert testimony based on scientific principles or procedures is admissible but only after a principle or procedure has gained general acceptance’ in its specified field” …. The test’s limited purpose is to ascertain whether the expert’s conclusion is based upon accepted scientific principles, rather than simply the expert’s own unsupported beliefs …. When applying the Fryetest to assess the reliability of an expert’s theory of causation, “it is not necessary that the underlying support for the theory . . . consist of cases or studies considering circumstances exactly parallel to those under consideration in the litigation. It is sufficient if a synthesis of various studies or cases reasonably permits the conclusion reached by the . . . expert'” …. “The fact that there [is] no textual authority directly on point to support the [expert’s] opinion is relevant only to the weight to be given the testimony, but does not preclude its admissibility”… .

[Here the] literature established that the expert’s theory had an objective basis and was founded upon far more than theoretical speculation or a scientific hunch … . The lack of textual authority to support the theory pertained to the weight to be given to his testimony, but did not preclude its admissibility ….  LaRose v Corrao, 2013 NY Slip Op 02719, 2nd Dept, 4-24-13

 

 

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