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WAIVED DEFENSE CAN BE INTERPOSED IN AN ANSWER AMENDED BY LEAVE OF COURT.

The Second Department determined defendant doctor in this medical malpractice action should have been allowed to amend his answer to add the defense of discharge in bankruptcy. The court noted that even where a defense is waived pursuant to CPLR 3211(e) it can be interposed in an answer amended by leave of court pursuant to 3025(b):

Even when a defense is waived under CPLR 3211(e), “it can nevertheless be interposed in an answer amended by leave of court pursuant to CPLR 3025(b), as long as the amendment does not cause the other party prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay, and is not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit” … . Under the circumstances of this case, we find that [defendant's] affirmative defense of discharge in bankruptcy is neither patently insufficient nor palpably devoid of merit, and there would be little or no prejudice resulting from any delay in granting leave to amend his answer to add this affirmative defense … . Dixon v Chang, 2016 NY Slip Op 01797, 2nd Dept 3-16-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (WAIVED DEFENSE CAN BE INTERPOSED IN AN ANSWER AMENDED BY LEAVE OF COURT)/AMENDED ANSWER (WAIVED DEFENSE CAN BE INTERPOSED IN AN ANSWER AMENDED BY LEAVE OF COURT)/AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES (WAIVED DEFENSE CAN BE INTERPOSED IN AN ANSWER AMENDED BY LEAVE OF COURT)

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STATEMENTS MADE BY ATTORNEY IN AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED TO THE COURT WERE ABSOLUTELY... EVIDENCE OF PRIOR UNCHARGED BAD ACTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED, ERROR HARMLESS...