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Criteria for Motion to Amend a Complaint and for the “Relation Back” Doctrine Explained

In affirming the denial of a motion to amend a complaint the Second Department described the law concerning amendment (CPLR 305) and “relation back” (CPLR 203):

CPLR 305(c) authorizes the court, in its discretion, to “allow any summons or proof of service of a summons to be amended, if a substantial right of a party against whom the summons issued is not prejudiced” (CPLR 305[c]). Where the motion is to cure “a misnomer in the description of a party defendant,” it should be granted even after the statute of limitations has run where “(1) there is evidence that the correct defendant (misnamed in the original process) has in fact been properly served, and (2) the correct defendant would not be prejudiced by granting the amendment sought”…. CPLR 305(c) does not apply in this case, where the plaintiff’s mistake in failing to commence the action against Keyspan-Ravenswood within the statute of limitations period had nothing to do with the misnomer… . * * *

As codified in CPLR 203(c), “what is commonly referred to as the relation back doctrine allows a claim asserted against a defendant in an amended filing to relate back to claims previously asserted against a codefendant for Statute of Limitations purposes where the two defendants are united in interest’ (CPLR 203[b])” ….. For the rule allowing relation back to the original date of filing under CPLR 203(c) to apply, a plaintiff is required to prove that: “(1) both claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, (2) the new party is united in interest with the original defendant, and by reason of that relationship can be charged with such notice of the institution of the action that the new party will not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the merits by the delayed, otherwise stale, commencement, and (3) the new party knew or should have known that, but for a mistake by the plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against that party as well” … .  Sally v Keyspan Energy Corp, 2013 NY Slip Op 03469, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

 

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