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Extension for Service of Complaint After Statute of Limitations Had Run Properly Granted in Exercise of Discretion

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion to allow service of a complaint after the 120 period for service had passed and the statute of limitations had run:

When considering whether to grant an extension of time to effect service beyond the 120-day statutory period in the interest of justice, the court may consider the plaintiff’s diligence, or lack thereof, along with other relevant factors, including the expiration of the statute of limitations, the potentially meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of the plaintiff’s request for the extension of time, and any prejudice to the defendant … . A determination of whether to grant the extension in the interest of justice is generally within the discretion of the motion court … .

In the instant case, an attempt at proper service was made within the 120-day period, which was later adjudicated to be defective. Furthermore, the statute of limitations had expired by the time the appellant challenged service as defective in its motion to vacate the default judgment, the plaintiff promptly cross-moved for an extension of time to effect proper service, and there was no demonstrable prejudice to the appellant attributable to the delay in effecting proper service. Under the circumstances, granting an extension of time pursuant to CPLR 306-b to serve the appellant was a provident exercise of discretion … .  Siragusa v D’Esposito, 2014 NY Slip Op 02570, 2nd Dept 4-16-14

 

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