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Cell Phone In Possession of Inmate Met the Definition of “Dangerous Contraband” in the Context of a “Promoting Prison Contraband” Charge

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Egan, determined that a cell phone constituted “dangerous contraband” within the meaning of “promoting prison contraband in the first degree.”  The testimony of the supervising superintendent about the protections put in place concerning the recording and restrictions on inmate phone calls were sufficient to demonstrate the cell phone met the definition of “dangerous contraband:”

In this regard, the Court of Appeals has instructed that “the test for determining whether an item is dangerous contraband is whether its particular characteristics are such that there is a substantial probability that the item will be used in a manner that is likely to cause death or other serious injury, to facilitate an escape, or to bring about other major threats to a detention facility’s institutional safety or security” … . Notably, “the distinction between contraband and dangerous contraband” does not turn upon “whether an item is legal or illegal outside of prison . . . [as] [i]t is obvious that an item, such as a razor, may be perfectly legal outside prison and yet constitute dangerous contraband when introduced into that unpredictable environment” … . Similarly, as our case law makes clear, the item in question need not be inherently dangerous in order to qualify as dangerous contraband. Indeed, although weapons are perhaps the most commonly recognized source of dangerous contraband in a prison setting … , courts have — applying the Finley test — reached the very same conclusion with respect to other items made, obtained or possessed by prison inmates, including illegal quantities of drugs …, a disposable Bic lighter …  and hand-drawn maps or knotted links of wire that could be used to facilitate an escape …. Although the majority in Finley did not expressly address this issue, Judge Pigott opined in his concurrence/dissent that, “[i]f the contraband at issue is not inherently dangerous . . . , the People must present specific, competent proof from which the trier of fact may infer that use of the contraband could potentially create a dangerous situation inside the facility” … . As a cell phone admittedly is not an inherently dangerous item, the question is whether the People adduced sufficient proof to establish the cell phone’s potential to be used in such a pernicious manner as to elevate it to the level of dangerous contraband. People v Green, 2014 NY Slip Op 03303, 3rd Dept 5-8-14

 

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