Requirements for a Negligence Action Against a Municipality (Based Upon Personal Injuries Allegedly Caused by the Actions of Police Officers) Explained

The Fourth Department, in affirming the grant of summary judgment to the defendant municipality in a suit based upon injuries alleged to have been caused by police officers, the court explained the law relevant to negligence suits against municipalities:

With respect to the negligence cause of action, it is well settled that, in an action against a municipality, it is “the fundamental obligation of a plaintiff pursuing a negligence cause of action to prove that the putative defendant owed a duty of care. Under the public duty rule, although a municipality owes a general duty to the public at large to [perform certain governmental functions], this does not create a duty of care running to a specific individual sufficient to support a negligence claim, unless the facts demonstrate that a special duty was created. This is an offshoot of the general proposition that[,] ‘[t]o sustain liability against a municipality, the duty breached must be more than that owed the public generally’ . . . The second principle relevant here relates not to an element of plaintiff[’s] negligence claim but to a defense that [is] potentially available to [defendant]—the governmental function immunity defense . . . [T]he common-law doctrine of governmental immunity continues to shield public entities from liability for discretionary actions taken during the performance of governmental functions . . . [pursuant to which] ‘[a] public employee’s discretionary acts—meaning conduct involving the exercise of reasoned judgment—may not result in the municipality’s liability even when the conduct is negligent’ ” … .

With respect to the issue whether a special duty exists, it is well settled “that an agency of government is not liable for the negligent performance of a governmental function unless there existed a special duty to the injured person, in contrast to a general duty owed to the public . . . Such a duty, . . . [i.e.,] a duty to exercise reasonable care toward the plaintiff[,] is born of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the governmental entity” … . “A special relationship can be formed in three ways: (1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation” … . According to plaintiff, a special relationship was formed in this case by the second method, i.e., the voluntary assumption of a duty of care by the municipal agency. That method requires plaintiff to establish “(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking … .

We conclude that defendants met their burden on the motion by establishing as a matter of law that there was no voluntary assumption of a duty of care, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether the police officers who came to the house assumed, through promise or action, any duty to act on his behalf. Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact with respect to that requirement, we conclude that he also failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the fourth requirement, i.e., whether he justifiably relied on any such assumption of duty by the police officers … . Consequently, we conclude that the court erred in denying the motion with respect to the negligence cause of action.

We further conclude, in any event, that the defense of governmental function immunity constitutes a separate and independent ground for dismissal of the negligence cause of action. That defense “shield[s] public entities from liability for discretionary actions taken during the performance of governmental functions” … . Here, defendants established that they were providing police protection and engaging in the investigation of possible criminal behavior. It is well settled that “[p]olice and fire protection are examples of long-recognized, quintessential governmental functions” … . Furthermore, “defendants established that the conduct of the police officers throughout the course of their interaction with [plaintiff] was undertaken in the exercise of reasoned professional judgment of the officers, and was not inconsistent with accepted police practice. Accordingly, such conduct cannot serve as a basis for municipal liability” … . Bower v City of Lockport…, 159, 4th Dept 3-21-14