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CODE PROVISION DID NOT SPECIFICALLY IMPOSE TORT LIABILITY ON ABUTTING LANDOWNERS FOR BREACH OF THE DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE SIDEWALK, LANDOWNER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined, under the town code, defendant abutting landowner was not liable for a sidewalk slip and fall. Although the code provision imposed a duty to maintain the sidewalk on the abutting landowner, the provision did not specifically impose tort liability:

Generally, liability for injuries sustained as a result of dangerous and defective conditions on public sidewalks is placed on the municipality, and not the abutting landowner … . ” However, an abutting landowner will be liable to a pedestrian injured by a defect in a sidewalk where the landowner created the defect, caused the defect to occur by some special use of the sidewalk, or breached a specific ordinance or statute which obligates [him or her] to maintain the sidewalk'” … . ” In order for a statute, ordinance or municipal charter to impose tort liability upon an abutting owner for injuries caused by his or her negligence, the language thereof must not only charge the landowner with a duty, it must also specifically state that if the landowner breaches that duty he [or she] will be liable to those who are injured'” … . Kilfoyle v Town of N. Hempstead, 2016 NY Slip Op 03141, 2nd Dept 4-27-16


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