You are here: / / 60-Day Rule Did Not Apply—Failure to Submit Proposed Order Within...

60-Day Rule Did Not Apply—Failure to Submit Proposed Order Within 60 Days Did Not Constitute Abandonment of the Claim

The Second Department determined the 60-day rule with respect to the submission of orders did not apply:

22 NYCRR 202.48, entitled “[s]ubmission of orders, judgments and decrees for signature,” states in pertinent part:

“(a) Proposed orders or judgments, with proof of service on all parties where the order is directed to be settled or submitted on notice, must be submitted for signature, unless otherwise directed by the court, within 60 days after the signing and filing of the decision directing that the order be settled or submitted.

“(b) Failure to submit the order or judgment timely shall be deemed an abandonment of the motion or action, unless for good cause shown.”

Here, the so-called 60-day rule set forth in 22 NYCRR 202.48 is not applicable because the Supreme Court’s direction that the defendants submit a proposed order with respect to an award of an attorney’s fee did not specify that the proposed order be settled or submitted on notice … . Accordingly, the plaintiff’s contention that the defendants abandoned their claim for an award of an attorney’s fee by failing to comply with the 60-day rule is without merit. 47 Thames Realty LLC v Robinson, 2014 NY Slip Op 06051, 2nd Dept 9-10-14

 

You might also like
IT WAS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE (ALTHOUGH HIGHLY UNLIKELY) THE TWO ASSAULT CONVICTIONS WERE BASED UPON THE SAME ACT, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.
Plaintiff’s Alleging a Deed Executed Within the Ten-Year Statute of Limitations for Adverse Possession Is Void Creates a Presumption of Possession by the Plaintiff Within the Ten-Year Period
“Lack of Capacity to Sue” Defense Waived If Not Raised in Pleadings/Court Should Not Have Decided Summary Judgment Motion by Searching the Record and Ruling On Issues Not Raised by Anyone
Sua Sponte Dismissal of Complaint Not Justified/Lack of Standing Not a Jurisdictional Defect
THE AFFIRMATIONS OF DISCONTINUANCE AND CANCELLATION WERE SILENT ON THE ACCELERATION OF THE MORTGAGE DEBT AND THEREFORE DID NOT STOP THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FROM RUNNING; THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).
COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT A TOWN POLICE OFFICER WHO WAS INJURED UNDERGOING A PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST AS A CANDIDATE FOR A COUNTY SWAT TEAM WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF THE COUNTY SUCH THAT THE POLICE OFFICER’S ONLY REMEDY WAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (SECOND DEPT).
MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF, A PASSENGER ON A MOTORCYCLE, WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE VAN DRIVER AND THE EMPLOYER OF THE VAN DRIVER WHO MADE A LEFT TURN INTO THE MOTORCYCLE’S PATH, THE GRAVES AMENDMENT MAY APPLY TO THE LESSOR OF THE VAN, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE SERIOUS INJURY AS SHE WAS NOT A COVERED PERSON UNDER THE NO-FAULT INSURANCE LAW (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Arbitrator’s Award Which Did Not Resolve the Controversy Properly Vac... Class Certification Not Available When Action Seeks Payment of a Nonwaivable...