You are here: / / “Temporary Substitute Vehicle” Not Excluded from Supplemental...

“Temporary Substitute Vehicle” Not Excluded from Supplemental Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Policy

The Second Department determined that the language of the policy did not exclude the driver (O’Brien) of a “temporary substitute” vehicle from coverage under the supplemental uninsured/underinsured motorist (SUM) policy.  O’Brien, an auto mechanic, was injured when returning a customer’s “loaner” car to the dealer (at the customer’s request). O’Brien was named as an additional driver on the loaner vehicle agreement:

“Generally, it is for the insured to establish coverage and for the insurer to prove that an exclusion in the policy applies to defeat coverage” … . Whether the burden of proof rests on the insured to establish coverage, or on the insurer to establish an exclusion, rests on the language of the policy (see id. ). “Where the provisions of the policy are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and courts should refrain from rewriting the agreement. The policy must, of course, be construed in favor of the insured, and ambiguities, if any, are to be resolved in the insured’s favor and against the insurer” … .

Here, State Farm bears the burden of establishing that O’Brien’s use of a “substitute temporary car” was excluded from SUM benefits. The opening language of the SUM endorsement states: “This endorsement is a part of the policy. Except for the changes it makes, all other provisions of the policy remain the same and apply to this endorsement.” Moreover, the opening language of the policy states: “We define certain words and phrases below for use throughout the policy. Each coverage includes additional definitions only for use with that coverage.” The general definition section includes a definition of “temporary substitute car,” which is to be applied throughout the policy: “Temporary Substitute Car means a car that is in the lawful possession of the person operating it and that: 1. replaces your car for a short time while your car is out of use due to its: a. breakdown; b. servicing; c. repair; d. loss; or e. destruction; and 2. neither you nor the person operating it own or have registered.”

This Court has held that the purpose of a provision relating to a “temporary substitute” vehicle “is to afford continuous coverage to the insured during the period that a vehicle scheduled under the policy is out of commission, and at the same time limit the risk to the insurer to one operating vehicle at a time for a single, fair premium. Coverage for a substitute vehicle ceases when the insured vehicle is repaired and returned to its owner” … . Here, the SUM endorsement fails to articulate any exclusion for a “temporary substitute car.” Matter of State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v O’Brien, 2014 NY Slip Op 06096, 2nd Dept 9-10-14

 

You might also like
THE ESTATE OF THE HUSBAND WAS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE PROPERTY PASSED TO THE WIFE UPON THE HUSBAND’S DEATH (SECOND DEPT).
​ THE CONDITIONAL PRECLUSION ORDER BECAME ABSOLUTE WHEN PLAINTIFF DID NOT COMPLY BY PROVIDING DEFENDANTS WITH MEDICAL AUTHORIZATIONS BY THE SPECIFIED DATE; BECAUSE PLAINTIFF OFFERED NO REASONABLE EXCUSE, PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM PRESENTING ANY MEDICAL EVIDENCE AT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).
THE TOWN BOARD OF APPEALS’ FAILURE TO ISSUE A DECISION ON PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR A SPECIAL EXCEPTION PERMIT AND AN AREA VARIANCE WITHIN THE 62 DAYS PRESCRIBED BY THE TOWN LAW WAS NOT A DENIAL BY DEFAULT; THEREFORE SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND THE MATTER WAS NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ANNULLED THE “DEFAULT DENIAL” AND ORDERED THE TOWN TO ISSUE THE PERMIT AND VARIANCE (SECOND DEPT).
Remainderman Was Entitled to the Tax and Insurance Payments Made on Behalf of the Holder of the Life Estate/Life Estate Should Have Been Extinguished as a Matter of Equity
“Warranty” Need Not Be Set Forth In Any Special Manner—Here the Language on the Declaration Page that “Warranted” a Fire Alarm Will Be “Fully Operational” Was a Valid Condition Precedent to the Insured’s Liability—Summary Judgment In Favor of Insurer Properly Granted
LYFT WAS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED SEXUAL ASSAULT BY A LYFT DRIVER; THE COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD BASED UPON THE ASSURANCES OF SAFETY ON LYFT’S WEBSITE (SECOND DEPT).
A COMPRESSOR ROLLING OFF A PALLET JACK ONTO PLAINTIFF’S ANKLE WAS NOT AN ELEVATION-RELATED ACCIDENT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1), REGULATION-VIOLATION RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OPPOSITION PAPERS PROPERLY CONSIDERED, CRITERIA FOR LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION EXPLAINED IN SOME DETAIL (SECOND DEPT).
County Clerk Not Authorized to Enter Judgment Where the Underlying Stipulation Required Notice Prior to Entry and Extrinsic Evidence Was Required to Calculate the Amount

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Probation Department’s Unauthorized Taking of DNA Evidence Required Suppression/Inevitable... Insurer Estopped (pursuant to Insurance Law 3420) from Disclaiming Coverage...