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Abutting Landowners Are Not Required, Pursuant to the NYC Administrative Code, to Remove Ice and Snow from Pedestrian Ramps—The Ramps Are Not Part of the Sidewalk

In reversing Supreme Court, the Second Department explained that pedestrian ramps are not part of the sidewalk and therefore abutting landowners are not required to remove ice and snow from a pedestrian ramp:

“Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210, which became effective September 14, 2003, shifted tort liability for injuries arising from a defective sidewalk from the City of New York to the abutting property owner” … . “However, pedestrian ramps are not part of the sidewalk for the purpose of imposing liability on abutting landowners pursuant to that provision” … . Stanziale v City of New York, 2014 Slip Op 08825, 2nd Dept 12-17-14

 

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