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Ordinance Making Abutting Property Owners Responsible for Removal of Ice and Snow from a Sidewalk Did Not Impose Tort Liability on Abutting Property Owner

The Second Department determined that an abutting property owner (Atlantic) could not be held liable for an ice/snow slip and fall on a sidewalk in the absence of an ordinance specifically imposing tort liability on the property owner, even where, as here, an ordinance made the property owner responsible for removal of ice and snow:

“Unless a statute or ordinance clearly imposes liability upon an abutting landowner, only a municipality may be held liable for the negligent failure to remove snow and ice from a public sidewalk” … . Although section 229-6 of the Code of the Village of Ossining (hereinafter the Village Code) requires a landowner to remove snow and ice from abutting public sidewalks, it does not specifically impose tort liability for a breach of that duty … . “In the absence of a statute or ordinance imposing liability, the owner of property abutting a public sidewalk will be held liable only where it, or someone on its behalf, undertook snow and ice removal efforts which made the naturally occurring conditions more hazardous” … . In their pleadings, the plaintiffs did not allege that the Atlantic defendants created the icy condition. Rather, the pleadings alleged that the Atlantic defendants were negligent in, inter alia, failing to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk. Since the Atlantic defendants established that section 229-6 of the Village Code did not impose tort liability upon them for a failure to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk, they demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … . Palka v Village of Ossining, 2014 NY Slip Op 05848, 2nd Dept 8-20-14

 

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