You are here: / / Improper Admission of Evidence of Similar (Pending) Criminal Charge under...
,

Improper Admission of Evidence of Similar (Pending) Criminal Charge under Molineux Required Reversal

The Fourth Department determined a new trial was required where the trial court allowed the prosecution to present evidence (in its direct case) of a pending attempted robbery charge under Molineux to prove identity.  The defendant was on trial for allegedly robbing a hotel clerk in Cayuga County and the Molineux evidence involved the attempted robbery of a hotel clerk in Onondaga County.  The Molineux evidence included the testimony of five witnesses and a video of the attempted robbery.  The Fourth Department wrote:

“Before admitting evidence of other crimes to establish identity, the Trial Judge must find that both modus operandi and defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the other crimes are established by clear and convincing evidence” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 4–514 [Farrell 11th ed]…).  Here, the record establishes that the court ruled that the evidence of defendant’s identity with respect to the attempted robbery would be admissible as a matter of law, but did not determine the relevancy of the identification evidence of the attempted robbery, nor did it properly balance its prejudicial effect as against its probative value… .  Additionally, there is no indication in the record that the court found that the modus operandi and defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the attempted robbery were established by clear and convincing evidence.  We thus conclude that the case before the jury became a prohibited “trial within a trial”… .  We further conclude that the evidence of the attempted robbery was “sufficiently prejudicial so as to deprive defendant of a fair trial”… .  People v Larkins, 756, 4th Dept 7-19-13

 

You might also like
THE GRAND JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE DEFINITION OF “IMPAIRED” IN THE CONTEXT OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1192 (4-A) (FELONY AGGRAVATED DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED); THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT DISAGREED WITH THE DEFINITION OF “IMPAIRED” ADOPTED BY THE THIRD DEPARTMENT (FOURTH DEPT).
Malicious Prosecution Action Against County, Medical Examiner and District Attorney Survived Motion to Dismiss/Prosecutorial and Governmental Immunity Doctrines Explained
Bank Was Not a Statutory Lien Law Trustee; Question of Fact Whether Bank Was Aware Funds Were Diverted Lien Law Trust Funds
Sentencing Court Must Make Finding Whether Eligible Youth Should Be Afforded Youthful Offender Status
PLAINTIFFS SUED A FOSTER-CHILD PLACEMENT SERVICE FOR FRAUD AND NEGLIGENCE AFTER THE FOSTER CHILD SEXUALLY ASSAULTED PLAINTIFFS’ BIOLOGICAL CHILD; THE FRAUD ACTION WAS NOT TIME-BARRED BECAUSE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE’S MERE KNOWLEDGE OF THE FOSTER CHILD’S SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN 2008 DID NOT START THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, AND THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION WAS SUPPORTED BY A DUTY OWED TO PLAINTIFFS’ BIOLOGICAL CHILD (FOURTH DEPT).
Termination of Parental Rights Affirmed Because Diligent Efforts to Reunite Parent and Child Were Made (In Spite of Misdiagnosis of Mother’s and Child’s Psychological Conditions)
THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THE GUN SHOTS AND THE 911 CALL STATING FOUR BLACK KIDS, ONE WITH A GUN, WERE WALKING AROUND JUSTIFIED APPROACHING DEFENDANT ON THE STREET AND JUSTIFIED PURSUING HIM AND SEARCHING HIM WHEN HE RAN; TWO DISSENTERS NOTED THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT MATCH THE 911 CALLER’S DESCRIPTION AND ARGUED HIS FLIGHT ALONE DID NOT JUSTIFY PURSUIT (FOURTH DEPT).
Sentence Greater than that Promised in a Plea Bargain Did Not Constitute Punishment for Exercising the Right to Go to Trial

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

In SORA Proceeding, Child Pornography Properly Considered Under Factor 7 (“Relationship... Defendant’s Wearing a Stun Belt During Trial Without Knowledge of Judge Did...