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Public Trust Doctrine Re: Allowing a Restaurant in a Public Park/License and Lease Characteristics Compared

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, the Court of Appeals determined that a the city’s allowing a restaurant to operate in a public park did not violate the public trust doctrine and the arrangement between the city and the restaurant was a valid license, not a lease (which would have required approval by the legislature):

Under the public trust doctrine, dedicated parkland cannot be converted to a non-park purpose for an extended period of time absent the approval of the State Legislature … . * * * … [A]lthough it is for the courts to determine what is and is not a park purpose, … the Commissioner enjoys broad discretion to choose among alternative valid park purposes. Observing that restaurants have long been operated in public parks, we [in 795 Fifth Ave Corp v City of New York, 15 NY2d 221] rejected plaintiffs' public trust claim, holding that they could show only a “difference of opinion” as to the best way to use the park space and that this “mere difference of opinion [was] not a demonstration of illegality”… . * * *

We have stated that parkland cannot be leased, even for a park purpose, absent legislative approval … . * * *

A document is a lease “if it grants not merely a revocable right to be exercised over the grantor's land without possessing any interest therein but the exclusive right to use and occupy that land” … . It is the conveyance of “absolute control and possession of property at an agreed rental which differentiates a lease from other arrangements dealing with property rights” …. . A license, on the other hand, is a revocable privilege given “to one, without interest in the lands of another, to do one or more acts of a temporary nature upon such lands” … . That a writing refers to itself as a license or lease is not determinative; rather, the true nature of the transaction must be gleaned from the rights and obligations set forth therein. Finally, a broad termination clause reserving to the grantor “the right to cancel whenever it decides in good faith to do so” is strongly indicative of a license as opposed to a lease … . Union Square Park Community Coalition Inc v New York City Department of Parks and Recreation, 17, CtApp 2-20-14

 

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